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St. John's University School of Law 
fees were available under a claim for 
maintenance and cure; and whether the 
Supreme Court's Miles decision and 
ninth circuit precedent precluded punitive 
damages on a general maritime action. 
The ninth circuit noted that in order for 
Glynn to recover under the Jones Act he 
had to show a defendant was his em­
ployer. Cosmopolitan Shopping Co. v. 
McAllister, 337 U.S. 783,787 n.6 ( 1949). 
The district court had found as a matter of 
Jaw that an employer/employee relation­
ship existed between Glynn and Roy AI. 
The ninth circuit rejected Roy Al's argu­
ment that the jury could have found 
Glynn to be a joint venturer or indepen­
dent contractor on the basis of the com­
pensation arrangement, which was based 
on a receipt of a percentage of profits. 
The appellate court concluded that no rea­
sonable jury could have found factually 
that Glynn was anything other than an 
employee, considering several factors 
such as payment, direction, supervision 
and source of power to hire and fire. 
Matute v. Lloyd Bermuda Lines, Ltd., 931 
F.2d 23 1 , 236 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 
u.s. 9 1 9  ( 1 99 1 ). 
The appeals court also concluded that 
the district court had erred in submitting 
defendant Shawhan's employer status as 
a j ury question. The court stated that, 
since there could only be one employer 
for the purposes of the Jones Act and that 
it had already been determined that Roy 
AI was Glynn's  employer, the jury should 
not have been permitted to consider the 
question of whether or not Shawhan was 
also Glynn's employer. 
With respect to the issue of whether 
Glynn was entitled to attorney's fees, the 
ninth circuit noted that it was well estab­
lished, since Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 
U.S. 527 ( 1962), that an injured seaman 
could recover attorney's fees where de­
fendant had acted willfully and persis­
tently in failing to pay maintenance and 
cure. The court treated the issue as aban­
doned by defendant Roy AI, since it did 
not seriously contest the issue of its 
"willful and persistent" failure to either 
investigate Glynn's claim or pay mainte­
nance. 
The appeals court, instead, focussed on 
Glynn's assertion that the lower court had 
not properly set the level of fees on his 
claim. The court determined that the 
lower court did not abuse its discretion in 
fixing the amount of fees awarded and 
Fal l1995 
that the amount awarded was reason­
able, affirming the result. The ninth 
circuit observed with approval that the 
district court, in fixing the fees, had 
used factors set forth in Kerr v. Screen 
Extras Guild, Inc., 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 
95 1 ( 1 976), such as time and labor re­
quired, novelty and difficulty of the 
question involved, skill necessary to 
pursue the claim, preclusion of other 
employment, etc. 
The ninth circuit focussed in the criti­
cal part of its opinion on the issue of 
whether the district court had erred in 
finding that Glynn was not entitled to 
punitive damages on the maintenance 
and cure claim. The court, in its analy­
sis, relied on Miles v. Apex Marine 
Corp. , 498 U.S. 1 9  ( 1 990), concluding 
that punitive damages are not recover­
able for defendant's willful, 'arbitrary 
and persistent failure to pay mainte­
nance and cure. Glynn v. Roy At Boat 
Management Corp. , 57 F.3d 1495, 
1 505. The court extended the Miles ra­
tionale l imiting nonpecuniary recovery 
to general maritime causes of action on 
the theory that such recovery was not 
provided for in the "uniform plan of 
maritime tort law Congress created." 
The appeals court rejected Glynn's ar­
gument that it should not abandon the 
ninth circuit's recognition of punitive 
damages for failure to pay maintenance 
and cure under the pre-Miles precedent 
of Evich v. Morris, 819 F.2d 256 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914  
( 1987). The court pointed out that the 
language in Evich supporting plain­
tiffs position was dictum. The ninth 
circuit expressly refused to follow the 
fifth circuit' s opinion in Guevara v. 
Maritime Overseas Corp., 34 F.3d 
1 279 (5th Cir. 1 994), where the court 
upheld a punitive damage award for 
failure to pay maintenance and cure. 
The ninth circuit noted that decisions 
upholding punitive damages relied 
"directly or indirectly" on the Vaughan 
case. The Supreme Court in that case 
had acknowledged for the first time 
that damages for failure to give mainte­
nance and cure may include "necessary 
expenses, including attorney's fees, 
when the failure to pay maintenance is 
willful and persistent." Glynn, 57 F.3d 
at 1 504. The ninth circuit concluded 
that there is no reason why the plaintiff 
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should be awarded punitive damages in 
addition to attorney's  fees since attor­
ney's fees alone were a powerful incen­
tive deterring employers from willfully 
and arbitrarily refusing to pay mainte­
nance and cure. 
As to other issues raised, the court 
ruled that Glynn's failure to submit the 
question of prejudgment interest to the 
jury served as a waiver on his prejudg­
ment entitlement and that the district 
court had not erred in finding that a 
magistrate could not order payment of 
maintenance and cure as a condition for 
lifting a default against defendants. The 
lower court had found that there was a 
disputed issue of fact as to whether any 
injury had befallen Glynn aboard the 
No Problem, which required a determi­
nation before he could prevail and, 
therefore, such an action by the magis­
trate would have been premature. 
Alexia I. Panteris 
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COGSA Carriers 
CH ARTERER CAN BIND VESSEL 
OWNER DESP ITE CH ARTER­
P ARTY INDEM NITY CL AUSE BY 
SIG NING "FOR TH E M ASTER" 
Charter party authorizing charterer 
to sign for master could bind vessel 
owner as COG SA carrier even 
though charter party ex pressly 
incl ud ed ind emnification provision; 
shippers fail ed to meet fifth circuit 
privity stand ard or make prima facie 
bailment cl aim against owner. 
(Thyssen Steel Company v. MIV Kava 
Yerakas, CA5, 50 F.3d 1349, 4127195) 
Thyssen Steel Company (Thyssen) 
entered into a contract with Europe­
Overseas Steamship Lines (Eurolines) 
to carry steel from Europe to Texas 
aboard the ship MN Kava Yerakas, 
which had been time chartered to 
Eurolines by its owner, Dodekaton 
Corporation (Dodekaton). Pursuant to 
loading the cargo of steel pipe, bills of 
lading were issued and signed by the 
Eurolines agent "for the master." 
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Upon arrival in Texas, some of the cargo 
was damaged. Thyssen and other plain­
tiffs brought an action against the M/V 
Kava Yerakas, Dodekaton and Eurolines 
for cargo damage occurring during tran­
sit. The district court entered judgment in 
favor of vessel owner Dodekaton. The 
other defendants settled and plaintiffs ap­
pealed the judgment in favor of Dodeka­
ton. 
Under COG SA, a cargo owner may only 
recover from the carrier of the goods. Pa­
cific Employers Ins. Co. v. MIV Gloria 
767 F.2d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 1985). A 
"carrier" is "the owner or the charterer 
who enters into a contract of carriage with 
a shipper." 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 l (a). A 
"contract of carriage" takes the form of a 
bill of lading or other similar document of 
title. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 l (b). A con­
tract of carriage with a vessel owner may 
be directly between the parties or through 
the charterer's authority to sign bills of 
lading "for the master." Pacific Employ­
ers, 767 F.2d at 236. If, however, the 
charterer signs without the authority of 
the vessel owner, then the owner will not 
be a party to the contract of carriage and 
will not be a "carrier" under COGSA. 
Pacific Employers, 767 F.2d at 237; J. 
Gerber & Co. v. MIV Inagua Tania, 828 
F.Supp. 458, 460 (S.D. Tex. 1 992). To 
establish liability for the vessel owner 
the cargo owner must show that th; 
shipowner was a party to the contract· 
failure to do so will show that the carg� 
owner did not rely on the owner to per­
form the contract. 
The district court did not confront the 
contention that Eurolines, the charterer, 
had power to sign bills of lading on be­
half of Dodekaton based on charter party 
provisions nearly indistinguishable from 
those contained in the Pacific Employers 
case. In Pacific Employers, the fifth cir­
cuit found that charter party provisions 
largely identical to Clause 8 and 45 of the 
Thyssen charter party entitled the char­
terer to sign bills of lading on behalf of 
the vessel owner. Pacific Employers, 767 
Fa111995 
F.2d at 237-38. However, the major de­
parture from the Pacific Employers' 
charter versus that of Thyssen is that the 
latter charter contained an in­
demnification provision, making the 
case more factually similar to a case in 
the fourth circuit, Yeramex Interna­
tional v. S.S. Tendo, 595 F.2d 943 (4th 
Cir. 1 979). The fifth circuit considered 
the Yeramex case in its analysis when 
examining the effect of the indemnity 
clause. 
A provision in a contract of carriaae 
that purports to relieve a party of liabii­
ity is expressly void under the Carriage 
of Goods by Sea Act. See 46 U.S.C. 
app. § 1 303(8). In the Yeramex case the 
fourth circuit did not allow a much more 
elaborate indemnity provision by itself 
alone to exonerate the vessel owner 
from traditional responsibilities for ves­
sel seaworthiness, etc. The fifth circuit 
circuit agreed with this concept, decid­
ing that the indemnity provision did not 
have a bearing on the owner's liability 
as a COGSA carrier. 
In sum, the fact that the parties had a 
charter party and bill of lading nearly 
identical to those found in Pacific Em­
ployers was controlling. Clause 45 of 
the Thyssen charter party entitled the 
master to allow Eurolines' agent to sign 
the bills of lading, binding the owner. 
If, the court stated, on remand, the ship­
pers proved that the master had actually 
authorized Eurolines to sign on his be­
half, then the Pacific Employers frame­
work would be fulfilled, providing nec­
essary privity with the vessel owner 
thereby meeting the definition of 
COGSA carrier. 
In the absence of this proof, the court 
held that the fifth circuit's standard for 
COGSA liability required privity, re­
jecting arguments by the plaintiffs hold­
ing up second circuit cases where claims 
were directly asserted against vessel 
owners in privity's absence. A better 
argument by Thyssen, which was enter­
tained by the court, was the assertion 
that the district court had erred in find­
ing no common law bailment claim 
against the vessel owner for cargo dam­
age. In the absence of COGSA 
"carriage of goods," which is defined as 
covering "the period from the time 
when the goods are loaded on to the 
time when they are discharged from the 
ship," 46 U.S.C. app. § 1 30 1 (e), the 
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plaintiffs argued that Dodekaton was li­
able under common law as a bailee of 
cargo for damage caused by its own 
negligence. 
The fifth circuit, however, found that 
plaintiff-appellants had not established 
a prima facie bailment claim against the 
owner. First, plaintiffs did not show 
that an express or implied bailment con­
tract existed. Second, the plaintiffs 
failed to establish that the cargo was 
within Dodekaton's exclusive posses­
sion during transit. (The cargo was also 
within Eurolines'- the charterer's­
possession.) The appeals court af­
firmed the district court, finding that, 
even if a general maritime bailment 
claim were permissible as a matter of 
law, Dodekaton was not liable as a 
bailee for cargo damage. 
William Burkett 
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Supplemental Rules 
SECOND CIRCUIT RULES 
COURTS CAN'T DENY 
COUNTERSECURITY ON 
ARBITRABLE ACTIONS 
While trial courts have broad discre­
tion when ordering countersecurity 
in proceedings brought under Section � of the Arbitration Act, arbitrability 
IS not permissible basis for denying 
countersecurity since the result 
would conflict with clear purposes of 
the Arbitration Act and Supplemen­
tal Fed. R. Civ. P .  E(7). 
(Result Shipping Co. , Ltd. v. Ferruzzi 
Trading USA, Inc. , CA2, 56 F.3d 394, 
5125195) 
Grain was shipped from the United 
States to Jordan pursuant to a contract 
between defendant Ferruzzi Trading 
USA, Inc. (Ferruzzi) and the Jordanian 
Ministry of Supply. Ferruzzi chartered �e MIV Bulk Topaz from Result Ship­
pmg Co., Ltd. (Result) in order to ship 
the grain. The charter party between 
Ferruzzi and Result provided that all 
disputes arising out of the charter would 
be subject to arbitration in London. 
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